

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, EG

SUBJECT: FAHMY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW

REF: CAIRO 10380

1. PLEASE PASS TO SADAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING
ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER IN RESPONSE TO SADAT'S
REQUEST FOR HIS VIEWS REPORTED IN REFTEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT: PRESIDENT VERY MUCH APPRECIATES SADAT'S
FRANKNESS IN SHARING SUCH DETAILED ACCOUNT OF FAHMY'S
DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. IN GENERAL, PRESIDENT BELIEVES
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 152347 ACTION WHITE HOUSE 30 JUN 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOR BREZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 152347 ACTION CAIRO JUNE 30.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, EG

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PAGE 02 STATE 152347

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TO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS
FOR UNDER SECRETARY BENSON ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 152347 ACTION MOSCOW 01 JUL 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 152347 ACTION WHITE HOUSE 30 JUN 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

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PAGE 02 STATE 152347

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 152347

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, EG

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOR BREZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 152347 ACTION CAIRO JUNE 30.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 152347

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, EG

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REF: CAIRO 10380

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CIPATE.

-- ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT FULLY RESPONSIVE TO EGYPT'S NEEDS, IF CONGRESS APPROVES WE HOPE IT WILL HAVE A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND THE ACTUAL ITEMS INVOLVED. THE PRESIDENT WISHES SADAT TO KNOW THAT HE IS KEEPING THIS GENERAL SUBJECT UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW.

-- AS CONCERNS THE SUDAN, FOLLOWING SADAT'S EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES DURING HIS VISIT HERE, PRESIDENT CARTER APPROVED THE SALE OF 6 C-130'S TO THE SUDAN. AS SADAT IS AWARE, WE INFORMED NUMIERI THAT THIS ACTION

FOLLOWED THE EFFECTIVE AND FORCEFUL ADVOCACY OF HIS CASE
BY SADAT.

-- AS SADAT KNOWS, BOTH OUR EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI FRIENDS
HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING US TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE
TO SUDANESE ARMS REQUESTS, GIVEN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN
ETHIOPIA AND SOVIET AMBITIONS IN THE AREA WHICH ARE AIMED
AT OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. THIS HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT
SITUATION FOR THE PRESIDENT GIVEN THE EMPHASIS IN HIS
ADMINISTRATION TO DECREASE THE WORLD-WIDE TRAFFIC IN CON-
VENTIONAL ARMS AND CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONGRESS.

-- SOVIET ATTITUDES AS EXPRESSED TO FAHMY, HOWEVER, CLEARLY
ADD WEIGHT AND URGENCY TO OUR REQUIREMENT TO BE AS FORTH-
COMING AS POSSIBLE. AS A RESULT, WE ARE CURRENTLY CON-
SIDERING ADDITIONAL SUDANESE REQUESTS
FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

-- WE TRUST SADAT WILL AGREE THAT OUR EFFORTS TO BE RESPON-
SIVE TO SUDANESE REQUESTS WILL SERVE OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS
SECRET

SECRET

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IH THE SUDAN AND HELP MEET THREAT OF EXPANSION OF SOVIET
INFLUENCE IN VITAL AREA OF HORN OF AFRICA. END TEXT. VANCE
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
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